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j .  M a r i a  g l o v e r   
 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive 
Law 
abstract.  The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence from the last five years repre-
sents the culmination of a three-decade-long expansion of the use of private arbitration as an al-
ternative to court adjudication in the resolution of disputes of virtually every type of justiciable 
claim. Because privatizing disputes that would otherwise be public may well erode public confi-
dence in public institutions and the judicial process, many observers have linked this decades-
long privatization of dispute resolution to an erosion of the public realm. Here, I argue that the 
Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence undermines the substantive law itself. 
While this shift from dispute resolution in courts—the public realm—to dispute resolution 
in arbitration—the private realm—initially undermined values and mechanisms of adjudication, 
the shift from public lawsuits to private arbitration now also threatens values and mechanisms 
of lawmaking. This new threat to the lawmaking function stems from a fundamental theoretical 
shift in the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence, cemented in its 2013 decision in American Express v. 
Italian Colors. As this piece explains, in Italian Colors, the Supreme Court subtly, but definitively, 
abandoned its descriptive and normative premise that freedom of contract was justified in the 
arbitration context because it would result in more cost-effective procedures for resolving dis-
putes, and, accordingly, enforcement of federal statutory regimes. In its place, the Court adopted 
a reductionist vision of arbitration as any set of private dispute resolution procedures chosen by 
the parties, no matter how onerous or inefficient, and it held that the Federal Arbitration Act re-
quired courts to enforce whatever terms the parties chose.  
Particularly given a pronounced reliance in the United States upon private litigants to en-
force statutory directives, the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence now threatens the sub-
stantive law itself. Through private arbitration contracts, private parties can effectively rewrite 
substantive law by rendering a host of legal claims mere nullities. What’s more, private parties 
can exercise this quasi-lawmaking power almost entirely outside of public view, through rarely 
read and little-understood provisions in contracts of adhesion subject to scant public scrutiny or 
regulatory oversight. The largely unchecked power of private entities to recalibrate their legal 
obligations, now recognized by the Court, leaves little to stop an erosion of substantive law. 
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introduction 
The Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence represents the cul-
mination of a three-decade-long expansion of the use of private arbitration as 
an alternative to court adjudication in the resolution of disputes of virtually 
every type of justiciable claim. As a result of this jurisprudence, cases that 
would otherwise proceed in the public realm—the courts—have been moved to 
a purely private realm, which is largely shielded from judicial and public scru-
tiny. Many observers have noted that this decades-long privatization of dispute 
resolution and attendant adjudicative mechanisms has led to both a loss of 
confidence in public adjudication and a loss of public adjudication itself—an 
erosion of the public realm. However, the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence 
from the last five years—and particularly its 2013 decision in American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant1—does far more: it undermines the substantive 
law itself. Indeed, the Court’s most recent arbitration jurisprudence has con-
ferred upon private entities a more fundamental power, antecedent to the au-
thority to adjust the mechanisms of adjudication used to enforce substantive 
law. This power is more akin to lawmaking. A private entity, through contrac-
tual arbitration provisions, can now significantly reduce or even remove its 
substantive legal obligations by eliminating claiming. That private contract 
drafter can, in effect, wield quasi-lawmaking power by rendering substantive 
law inapplicable to a great deal of its primary conduct. Given the central role of 
private enforcement to the achievement of legislative directives,2 private entities 
can therefore use contractual arbitration provisions effectively to erode sub-
stantive law from the books, with the consequent erosion of both the private 
compensatory goals and public deterrent objectives of that law.  
As an initial matter, one can situate the trend toward privatizing dispute 
resolution within a broader narrative about the erosion of the public realm in 
the world of litigation writ large. For years, scholars have traced, and alterna-
tively lamented and lauded, the near-total disappearance of the trial, the most 
public feature of our civil litigation system.3 There are myriad explanations for 
 
1. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
2.    See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public 
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1146-1160 (2012) (describing Congress’s pronounced reli-
ance on private litigants to enforce statutes); SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 3-5 
(2010) (contending that intrabranch conflicts encourage Congress to effectuate its substan-
tive aims through private enforcement of statutes).  
3. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement Divide, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); 
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of 
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the decline in trial rates,4 but an undoubted descriptive consequence of the van-
ishing trial—and the corresponding rise of settlement as the dominant end-
game in litigation—has been a decline in the transparency of case outcomes and 
often of the judicial and litigation processes behind those outcomes. Norma-
tively, scholars have argued that the large-scale shift from trial to settlement 
has resulted in significant losses to the values of democratic participation,5 le-
gitimacy,6 deterrence,7 accuracy,8 judicial independence,9 egalitarianism,10 
transparency,11 and peacekeeping.12 Moreover, the confidentiality of private 
settlements frustrates public access and deprives future litigants of the benefits 
of precedential decision-making.13 As I have discussed in prior work, the rise of 
settlement, unaccompanied by procedural change that would provide for ro-
bust pre-trial judicial assessment of the merits of claims, has resulted in fewer 
judicial pronouncements of law and judicial applications of law to facts.14 
Moreover, some have argued that this state of affairs diminishes public confi-
dence in public institutions and leads to stagnation in public law.15  
Similar arguments have been raised about the values lost when public pro-
ceedings and transparency are traded for the arguable convenience and efficien-
cy of private dispute resolution through arbitration. First, privatizing disputes 
that would otherwise be public may well erode public confidence in public in-
stitutions and the judicial process by removing disputes from the public realm. 
Litigation proceedings in court enable public discussion of governmental and 
 
the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, 
and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771 (2008).  
4. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 3 at 477-81; J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settle-
ment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1721-22 (2012).  
5. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 1089-90; Luban, supra note 3, at 2625, 2634, 2639; Resnik, su-
pra note 3, at 787, 806-07. 
6. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 1089-90; Luban, supra note 3, at 2625, 2634; Resnik, supra note 
3, at 806-07. 
7. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 3, at 1084 (discussing the deterrent effect of the contempt power in 
relation to consent decrees); Resnik, supra note 3, at 805. 
8. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1080-81; Luban, supra note 3, at 2639-40; Resnik, supra note 3, at 784. 
9. Luban, supra note 3, at 2639; Resnik, supra note 3, at 787. 
10. Fiss, supra note 3, at 1078; Resnik, supra note 3, at 807-08. 
11. Luban, supra note 3, at 2625. 
12. Id. at 2634. 
13. Id. at 2622-25; see also Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: 
The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 715 (2004) (“[C]ourts too 
often rubber-stamp confidentiality orders presented to them.”). 
14. Glover, supra note 4, at 1724, 1738.  
15. Luban, supra note 3, at 2622-23.  
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other public affairs; they provide checks against both unfairness to some liti-
gants that may flourish behind closed doors16 and potentially corrupt practices 
by attorneys, judicial officers, and litigants.17 Second, and relatedly, privatizing 
dispute resolution may undermine the functioning of judicial institutions 
themselves by decreasing public and private investment in the courts.18 Third, 
privatization threatens to impede public awareness of the substantive law, in-
asmuch as private proceedings frustrate the public’s ability to understand the 
state of the law, how particular laws are interpreted, and how claims are pur-
sued.19  
There is, however, an additional consequence of the Supreme Court’s re-
cent arbitration jurisprudence: it threatens to diminish not just the public 
realm, but also the public law itself. Whereas the shift from dispute resolution 
in courts, the public realm, to dispute resolution in arbitration, the private 
realm, initially undermined the transparency and mechanisms of adjudication, 
 
16. Brief for Appellee at 40, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-3859), 2013 WL 100597 (“Secret judicial arbitration for businesses can foster suspi-
cion that the law and justice apply differently, with one set of rules (substantive and proce-
dural) and secret justice for wealthy companies, and another set of rules for the rest.”); see 
also Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time To Let Some Sun Shine 
in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 487, 490-91 (2006) (“Arbitra-
tion confidentiality perpetuates public ignorance of continuing hazards, systemic problems, 
or public needs, [which is particularly problematic since] . . . [o]ne-shot participants cannot 
easily or inexpensively access information concerning arbitrator bias, misconduct, or con-
flicts of interest necessary for an informed selection of arbitrators.”).  
17. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2011); Brief for Appellee, supra note 16, at 40, 
*39-40 (citing Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Resnik, 
supra note 3, at 804 (“Open court proceedings enable people to watch, debate, develop, con-
test, and materialize the exercise of both public and private power.”).  
18. Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1801 (2014) (“[T]he rise of . . . outsourcing 
[dispute resolution] to private providers—wholeheartedly promoted by official voices of the 
federal judiciary—closes off public access by siting dispute resolution outside of the public 
sphere. Not only are potential claimants losing knowledge of alleged injuries and the modes 
of redress, but these new forms of dispute resolution undermine rationales for public and 
private investments in the lower federal courts.”).  
19. Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
803, 807 (2009) (“Privatizing the enforcement of statutory rights erodes those rights, as 
rights that are not enforced publicly vanish from the public’s eye, making the public less ed-
ucated about the laws governing society and probably less likely to recognize and correct the 
laws’ violations.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc. in Support of Plain-
tiff-Appellee, Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. Urging Affirmance at 20, 
Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (No. 12-3859), 2013 WL 175551 (“[W]hen the public does not have access 
to proceedings in which statutory rights are adjudicated, that lack of understanding of how 
statutes are interpreted and applied stifles discourse on the utility of those statutes.”).  
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the shift from public lawsuits to private arbitration now also threatens both the 
transparency and mechanisms of lawmaking. These newer threats to the law-
making function were cemented in the Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.20 In that case, the Court subtly, but de-
finitively, made a fundamental theoretical shift in its conception of arbitration 
as a contract for procedures to achieve the efficient resolution of disputes to one 
of a contract for any set of procedures, no matter how onerous to the arbitra-
tion of claims. It thereby authorized private parties to use mandatory private 
arbitration clauses to construct procedural rules that have the foreseeable, in-
deed possibly intended, consequence of preventing certain claims from being 
asserted at all,21 rendering those claims mere nullities. And the disappearance 
of claims will not be limited to individual would-be litigants, inasmuch as 
many of the legal claims that arise out of these contractual relationships inure 
not to a single individual, but to many or all of the various individual signers of 
the agreements. In other words, this jurisprudence does not merely affect the 
private disputes of two contracting parties; it diminishes the impact of sub-
stantive law on the conduct of contract drafters across wide swaths of the legal 
landscape. The Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence—one might say its re-
cent arbitration revolution—thus threatens the values of public dispute resolu-
tion in a fundamentally new and more dramatic way. Through the procedural 
device of private arbitration, private parties have the quasi-lawmaking power 
to write substantive law largely off the books by precluding or severely imped-
ing the assertion of various civil claims. And they can do so almost entirely out-
side of public view, through commercial (and sometimes confidential) con-
tracts subject to virtually no public scrutiny or regulatory oversight.  
This paper unfolds in three parts. Part I explains how the Supreme Court’s 
recent arbitration jurisprudence constitutes a fundamental theoretical shift. In 
contrast to the Court’s long-held vision of arbitration as a mechanism for 
achieving a cost-effective means of claim resolution outside of judicial fora, the 
Court has recast arbitration as a purely contractual mechanism through which 
private parties may craft provisions that provide them with effective immunity 
from substantive legal obligations. Indeed, given our regulatory system’s heavy 
 
20. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
21. See, e.g., Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 19, at 803-04 (noting that a wide swath of claims—
including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991—were intended to be enforced by the judiciary but are now frequently 
required to be arbitrated, given the rise of arbitration agreements in contracts for employ-
ment and consumer goods). The Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence in general, and its 
decision in Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, in particular, enables and even incentivizes contract 
drafters to craft their agreements in such a way that these and other statutory rights will go 
underenforced or unenforced entirely. See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.  
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reliance upon private enforcement of substantive law,22 arbitration agreements 
can be used to render substantive law virtually inapplicable to the primary con-
duct of the drafter of that arbitration agreement. Part II analyzes the ways in 
which the Court’s recent jurisprudence threatens conceptions of both the law-
making function and the substantive law itself, raising fundamental questions 
about what private parties may do, and what publicly accountable bodies alone 
should do. Part II also explains how this method of legal reform is largely hid-
den from public view and, partly because of that lack of transparency, why the 
effects of the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence are unlikely to be un-
done. Part III concludes that, currently, the power of private parties to control 
substantive legal obligations stands largely unchecked, leaving little to stop the 
erosion of substantive law. 
i .  disappearing claims:  the supreme court’s  new 
arbitration revolution  
The Court’s early arbitration jurisprudence ushered in a sea change in dis-
pute resolution, moving vast swaths of cases from the public realm—the 
courts—to a private one—arbitration. Part I.A briefly traces this early rise of 
binding arbitration agreements, as sanctioned by the Supreme Court begin-
ning in the 1980s. The vast expansion of privatized dispute resolution that 
came in the wake of this jurisprudence was revolutionary, particularly insofar 
as it led to a significant erosion of the public realm at the behest of private arbi-
tration contracts. This change, however, was justified by two related and criti-
cal premises: first, that freedom of contract facilitated arbitration proceedings, 
and second, that arbitration proceedings constituted an efficient, cost-effective 
means for enforcing federal substantive law. Indeed, the Court had long sug-
gested, if not expressly held, that this freedom of contract over the locus and 
mechanisms of adjudication did not stretch so far as to supersede substantive 
law.23 In other words, if freedom of contract and the enforcement of substan-
 
22. See Glover, supra note 2, at 1147-60 (discussing the role of private litigants as primary en-
forcers of a host of legislative directives–for example, antitrust laws, securities law, civil 
rights laws – and the paucity of public enforcement of those same statutes). 
23.  When referring to substantive law in this piece, my focus is largely on statutory law for two 
reasons. First, the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence represents a clear departure from 
its repeatedly-articulated reluctance to apply the Federal Arbitration Act in a way that would 
prevent the vindication of statutory claims. Second, the erosion of statutory law through 
private contract enabled by this recent jurisprudence puts squarely into focus questions re-
garding what private contracting parties may do and what public legislatures alone must do. 
This focus, however, does not exclude the reality that the Supreme Court’s recent jurispru-
dence could also erode all substantive law—common law included—in unobserved and 
largely unobservable ways. See infra Part II.A. 
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tive rights through arbitration came into tension, then freedom of contract 
would yield. An arbitration contract that eliminated the enforcement of sub-
stantive law would not stand.24  
As Part I.B describes, however, when freedom of contract and the enforce-
ment of substantive rights through arbitration did come into inevitable ten-
sion, the Court resolved that tension in precisely the opposite way. In American 
Express v. Italian Colors, the Court essentially permitted, even incentivized, pri-
vate parties drafting arbitration contracts to do so in a way that allowed them 
to reduce or even eliminate their obligations under substantive law.25 In so do-
ing, the Court has effectuated what one might call a second arbitration revolu-
tion: by handing this quasi-lawmaking power to private parties and by reduc-
ing substantive statutory rights to mere formalities—to little more than empty 
rights26—the Court has eroded the substantive law itself.  
A. The Rise of Arbitration Agreements To Facilitate the Resolution of Disputes in 
Private Fora 
The rise of binding arbitration clauses in private contracts has been well 
traced.27 To summarize briefly, in response to a period of “hostility” by the fed-
eral courts28 toward private arbitration agreements, Congress passed the Fed-
 
24. As the Court wrote in Mitsubishi Motors, if parties used arbitration contracts to effectuate 
“prospective waiver[s]” of statutory rights, the Court “would have little hesitation in con-
demning the agreement as against public policy.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985). 
25. See infra Part II.A.. 
26. Here I refer to the notion that rights without remedies (“ubi jus ibi remedium”), or effective 
remedies, are empty rights. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
§ 20 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell Oxford 1946) (“[W]here an appeal to the law and 
constituted judges lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice . . . 
to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men or party of men, there it is hard 
to imagine anything but a state of war. For . . . it is still violence and injury, however col-
oured with the name, pretences, or forms of law . . . .”). To be clear, I argue that the “per-
verting of justice” along these lines is not “manifest,” but is in fact deeply concealed. My 
view is that stealth perversion of justice is just as bad as manifest injustice, or perhaps in 
some ways worse, because manifest injustice can provoke a political backlash whereas 
stealth injustice does not. See infra Part II.  
27. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393-95 (2005); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Uncon-
scionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1735, 1740-42 (2006); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1101, 1136-37 (2006).  
28. Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or To Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 215 (2000).  
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eral Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, providing that written arbitration agree-
ments “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”29 Corporations and 
businesses in the United States did not initially use arbitration agreements to 
require employees, consumers, franchisees, or other parties typically under-
stood to stand in weaker bargaining positions to resolve disputes through pri-
vate arbitration, and the legislative history of the FAA indicates that the bill’s 
supporters likely did not intend for it to cover such agreements, but rather to 
cover negotiated agreements between merchants.30 Early Supreme Court juris-
prudence on the issue likewise indicated that the Court would not apply arbi-
tration clauses in contracts of adhesion against consumers and employees31—in 
other words, where parties to a given contract were differently and unequally 
situated vis-à-vis bargaining power.32 In addition, the Court expressed hesita-
tion about applying arbitration agreements when federal statutory rights were 
at issue.33  
 
29. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
30. Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitra-
tion: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th 
Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (assuring Senator Sterling that the FAA was 
not intended to “be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the 
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what 
their damages are, if they want to do it”); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney 
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV 183 (noting that Congress likely meant to exclude employment 
contracts under FAA section 1); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big 
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. 
L. REV. 33, 37 (1997) at 76-77 (pointing out that the legislative history of the FAA makes 
clear that it was not intended to cover contracts of adhesion at all); Jean R. Stern-
light, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could 
Not Have Intended, 47  U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 310-13 (1999) (noting that the 
FAA’s legislative history reflects legislators’ concern that arbitration not be imposed through 
non-negotiable contracts of adhesion in the employment or insurance context).  
31. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953). 
32. Id. at 435 (“While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances, may deal 
at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to 
the disadvantages under which buyers labor,” and “[e]ven though the provisions of the Se-
curities Act, advantageous to the buyer, apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened 
in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.”); see also Conover v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that a major “consideration at play in 
[Wilko] . . . was the bargaining posture of the parties”); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977). 
33. In Wilko, the Supreme Court held that claims under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
711-77aa (2012), were not subject to arbitration. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34, 438 (finding that 
“in so far as the award in arbitration may be affected by legal requirements, statutes or 
common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the provisions of the Securities Act 
control”). 
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The Court changed its views quite dramatically in the 1980s, when it first 
issued its now oft-quoted proclamation that the FAA evidences a “liberal feder-
al policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substan-
tive or procedural policies to the contrary.”34 In a series of cases, the Supreme 
Court abandoned its prior skepticism regarding arbitration of federal claims 
and held that arbitration agreements could be enforced with respect to a broad 
range of federal statutes: against consumers seeking to vindicate federal anti-
trust laws,35 investors seeking to vindicate the securities laws,36 and employees 
seeking to vindicate federal anti-discrimination laws.37 Since then, the Court 
has further expanded the FAA, holding that all federal statutory claims are ar-
bitrable unless Congress has expressly provided to the contrary, which it has 
done in only the rarest of circumstances.38 As a result of the Court’s expansion 
of the FAA, arbitration agreements proliferated,39 appearing in form contracts, 
mail inserts, shrink-wrap licenses,40 and the like, and requiring consumers, 
 
34. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  
35. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985).  
36. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).  
37. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).  
38. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669-671 (2012) (refusing to read the 
Credit Repair Organization Act’s nonwaiver provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a), as a “congres-
sional command” that the FAA did not apply). 
39. The actual form of arbitration clauses also has changed substantially during the last twenty 
years. While the FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be written, it does not require 
that they be signed to be enforceable. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volun-
teering” To Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experi-
ence, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 57-59, 73-74 (2004) (focusing on industries that pro-
vided what the authors deemed “important purchases” [e.g. transactions that were 
expensive, such as automobile purchases], ongoing [e.g. long distance telephone service], or 
that had potentially large social impacts [e.g. health care services] and noting that, unsur-
prisingly, these industries began including arbitration agreements in documents that, while 
sent to consumers, were not of the types usually read or signed). U.S. businesses have in-
cluded arbitration agreements in small print notices sent to consumers already bound to 
contracts, in envelope stuffers, see, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding unconscionable an arbitration clause imposed on telephone consumers via envelope 
stuffers), in warranties contained in boxes, see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 
(7th Cir. 1997) (upholding an arbitration clause imposed upon consumers via a warranty 
brochure in the computer box), on websites, see, e.g., Dell’s Online Policies: U.S. Terms & 
Conditions of Sale, DELL INC. (2015), http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/policy 
/en/policy?c=us&1=en&s=gen&~section=012 [http://perma.cc/7A47-7GKTB], and in e-mail 
communications, see, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 
149 (D. Mass. 2004) (finding e-mail notification insufficient to require employees to resolve 
disputes in binding arbitration). 
40. See, e.g., Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148. 
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employees, patients, and others to resolve any potential claims through private 
arbitration rather than through the courts.41  
The Court’s expansion of arbitrability rested on a particular conception of 
private arbitration as a cost-efficient, expeditious, and therefore effective pro-
cedural means of determining whether federal law had been violated. This crit-
ical premise—that arbitration served merely as an alternative mechanism for 
dispute proceedings and claim resolution, and thus that the freedom to craft 
arbitration contracts was simply a freedom to streamline adjudicative mecha-
nisms—allowed the Court to justify arbitration of federal statutory claims as 
fully consistent with the enforcement of federal law.42 This core concept of ar-
bitration as an alternative forum for the resolution of claims appears in some 
form in virtually all of the Court’s early cases expanding the scope of arbitrabil-
ity. An illustrative case is Mitsubishi Motors, which held federal antitrust laws to 
be arbitrable by emphasizing that the “hallmarks of arbitration” included 
“streamlined proceedings and expeditious results” and “access to expertise” in 
the selection of arbitrators.43 Parties “trade[] the procedures and opportunity 
for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of 
 
41. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631 
(2005) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has approved and even encouraged U.S. com-
panies to use various forms of contracts to bind consumers and the like to binding arbitra-
tion). 
42. Indeed, one could argue that the text of the Federal Arbitration Act itself so limits  these con-
tracts. Specifically, Section 2 of the FAA states that “a contract evidencing a transaction in-
volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis 
added). The word “settle” suggests that contracts for arbitration are contracts for resolving 
disputes; the effect of the arbitration agreement is thus simply to change the forum in which 
a dispute is settled or resolved. To the extent a contract for arbitration frustrates or inhibits 
the resolving or settling of a dispute, that contra ct arguably falls outside the scope of FAA 
Section 2.  
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985). Even 
before Mitsubishi, the Court focused on the streamlined, cost-effective nature of arbitration 
as a justification for broadening the scope of the FAA. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (finding that arbitration presented an attractive alternative to “pro-
longed litigation”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 415 
(1967) (recognizing these benefits of arbitration, though refusing to extend the FAA to cases 
of contractual fraud); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 379 
(1974) (emphasizing arbitrators’ superior expertise in a particular industry as relevant to in-
terpreting collective bargaining agreements); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & 
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (same). But see McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 
U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (expressing concern that while an arbiter might be an expert in the 
“law of the shop,” he was less familiar with the “law of the land”).  
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arbitration.”44 In fact, the Court observed, “it is the informality of arbitral pro-
cedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious 
means for dispute resolution.”45 It suggested that a forum-selection clause may 
be set aside if a party can show that “proceedings in the contractual forum will 
be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all 
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.”46 Likewise, Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, which expanded arbitration to the securi-
ties laws, justified the expansion on the ground that “the streamlined procedures 
of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive 
rights.”47 Indeed, the Court rejected its prior skepticism of arbitration on the 
grounds that it had underestimated the efficacy of arbitration.  
However, in these same cases, the Court emphasized not only the simplici-
ty, expeditiousness, and cost-effectiveness of arbitration, but also the point that 
parties are “generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see 
fit.”48 As the Court put it repeatedly, arbitration “is a matter of contract,” and 
courts must therefore give effect to the parties’ intent.49 Critical, though, is that 
in the view of these cases, there was no contradiction or tension whatsoever be-
tween both efficient and resolution-facilitative procedures, on the one hand, 
and freedom of contract, on the other. Rather, the Court embraced freedom of 
contract as fostering claim-facilitative procedures, both as a descriptive matter 
and as a normative one. Descriptively, the Court believed that “it is often a 
judgment that streamlined proceedings and expeditious results will best serve 
their needs that causes parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes; it is typically 
a desire to keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within 
manageable bounds that prompts them mutually to forgo access to judicial 
remedies.”50 In other words, the Court believed that parties would contract for 
procedures that streamlined their disputes and resulted in more expeditious 
proceedings.  
 
44. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257, 269 (2009) 
(“Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolu-
tion.”). 
45. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 648 n.14. 
46. Id. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). 
48. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458 (2003) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)). 
49. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 485 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). 
50. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633. 
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Normatively, the Court also believed that freedom of contract was essential 
for arbitration to realize its promise as an efficient dispute resolution mecha-
nism because of the parties’ need for procedural “adaptability.”51 As the Court 
noted in Mitsubishi, for example, competitors in the same industry could, if 
they thought it expeditious, agree to select an industry expert to arbitrate their 
claims.52 More generally, parties could adopt procedural rules that were tai-
lored to the nature, stakes, and substance of likely disputes.  
The Court’s willingness to subject federal statutory claims to private arbi-
tral dispute resolution thus depended on two mutually reinforcing principles: 
first, that arbitration facilitated claim resolution and therefore was fully con-
sistent with the effective enforcement of federal substantive law, and second, 
that parties’ freedom to tailor procedures to their specific needs was consistent 
with—indeed, a necessary condition of—arbitration’s effectiveness. As the 
Court put it in Mitsubishi, if parties used arbitration as a way to effectuate a 
“prospective waiver” of federal statutory rights, then the Court “would have 
little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.”53 In 
short, while the Court was comfortable with the notion that private arbitration 
would usher in an erosion of the public realm, it was unwilling to empower 
private parties with the ability to recalibrate the substantive law itself. The 
Court considered the freedom of contract that parties possessed vis-à-vis arbi-
tration to extend only so far as was necessary to facilitate the resolution of fed-
eral claims, not so far as to effectively bar them.  
B. The Rise of Arbitration Agreements that Frustrate or Eliminate the Resolution 
of Claims in Any Forum 
These two underpinnings of the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence—one, 
that arbitration is a matter of contract, and two, that arbitration contracts pro-
vide a means of efficiently determining whether substantive law has been vio-
lated—quickly came under strain. As the Court held arbitration to be permissi-
ble across a wide swath of claims, U.S. companies not only increased their 
usage of arbitration agreements to compel arbitration, but also began using 
these agreements to tilt the rules of the arbitral forum in their own favor.54 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. (“[A]rbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by the 
parties or appointed by the tribunal. Moreover, it is often a judgment that streamlined pro-
ceedings and expeditious results will best serve their needs that causes parties to agree to ar-
bitrate their disputes . . . .”). 
53. Id. at 637 n.19.  
54. The fact that contract drafters were using arbitration agreements to tilt the rules of dispute 
resolution in their favor appeared to be at odds with the Court’s jurisprudence on the mat-
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This shift has meant establishing procedural rules that do not streamline arbi-
tration, but, if anything, have made it more burdensome and difficult for par-
ties to resolve their claims. For example, businesses have used arbitration 
agreements in (sometimes successful) efforts to shorten statutes of limita-
tions,55 restrict discovery,56 require a claimant to file in a particular and perhaps 
 
ter. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (“[C]ourts should remain attuned to well-supported claims 
that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic 
power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) 
(reasoning that a party might “seek[] to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground 
that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive”); McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 
U.S. 284, 291, (1984) (holding that arbitration agreements could not mandate enforcement 
of contractual rights in lieu of conflicting statutory rights); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight 
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981) (same); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 
52 (1974) (holding that arbitration agreements could not waive statutory rights altogether). 
In addition, lower courts using unconscionability doctrine frequently called out arbitration 
contract drafters on such practices. See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 233 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that a party could not benefit from choice-of-law principles applying 
state law favorable to class arbitration waivers if the claims at issue were of such low value to 
preclude individual relief); Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“A clause that unilaterally and severely limits the remedies of only one side is sub-
stantively unconscionable under Washington law for denying any meaningful remedy.” (cit-
ing Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash. 2d 843, 857 (2007)); Skirchak v. Dynamics Re-
search Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that a misrepresentation of a waiver in 
an arbitration agreement, whether intentional or not, was unconscionable under Massachu-
setts law); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that where the party with “substantially greater bargaining power” misrepresented 
or pressured customers into signing arbitration agreements, those agreements were uncon-
scionable under California law); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 
2007) (holding that circumstances that could invalidate class action waivers included, but 
were not limited to “the fairness of the provisions, the cost to an individual plaintiff of vin-
dicating the claim when compared to the plaintiff’s potential recovery, the ability to recover 
attorneys’ fees and other costs and thus obtain legal representation to prosecute the underly-
ing claim, the practical [effect] on a company’s ability to engage in unchecked market be-
havior, and related public policy concerns”).  
55. Compare D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 330 (D. Conn. 2011) (uphold-
ing arbitration clause in leasing agreement between nightclub and exotic dancers that short-
ened statute of limitations); and Wilks v. Pep Boys, 241 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (M.D. Tenn. 
2003) (upholding agreement that waived equitable tolling of statute of limitations) with Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (invaliding an employ-
ment clause that imposed a shortened statute of limitations on employees); and Stirlen v. 
Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding shortened statute of 
limitations clause unconscionable). 
56. Generally, arbitration clauses leave discovery to the arbitrator’s discretion, but it is well rec-
ognized that discovery is less available in arbitration than in litigation. See Caley v. Gulf-
stream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1378 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding limited discovery 
under the recognition that “the fact that certain litigation devices may not be available in an 
arbitration is part and parcel of arbitration’s ability to offer ‘simplicity, informality, and ex-
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distant forum,57 bar consumers or employees from recovering particular forms 
of relief,58 and, most prominently, to preclude plaintiffs from joining together 
in aggregate litigation through class action waivers.59 This last restriction on 
the use of aggregate proceedings in arbitration has consumed the bulk of the 
Supreme Court’s attention in recent years, and through those cases the Court 
has revolutionized its approach to arbitration in a way that goes well beyond 
removing claims from public fora. Its new approach erodes substantive law it-
self by empowering private parties, through contract, to frustrate or altogether 
eliminate claiming in any forum, and thereby to rewrite the scope of their obli-
gations under substantive law. 
The Court’s resolution of the particular issue of the enforceability of class 
action waivers is now well known. To summarize briefly, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,60 the Court took its first step by holding that 
arbitrators “exceeded their powers” under § 10(a) of the FAA by imposing class 
arbitration even though the parties’ agreement was “silent” on the issue – a si-
lence the Court interpreted as an absence of agreement on the availability of 
class arbitration procedures.61 Then, two years later, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,62 the Court held that the FAA preempts state laws that “condition[] 
 
pedition’”); Sternlight, supra note 41, at 1641 n.51. A few courts have held unenforceable ar-
bitration clauses that unduly limit access to essential documents and witnesses. See, e.g., 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal. 2000). 
57. Compare Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(upholding forum selection clause that forced consultant-employees from Hawaii, Ken-
tucky, and Nevada to undergo arbitration in San Francisco), with Patterson v. ITT Consum-
er Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce an arbi-
tration clause imposed by a financing organization upon California consumers that required 
arbitration to be heard in Minneapolis, noting that, though such a procedure might be fair if 
applied to a business entity, it was not necessarily just when applied to consumers); and 
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding un-
conscionable an arbitration agreement that required nationwide consumers to arbitrate 
claims in Chicago). 
58. See, e.g., Anderson v. Comcast Corp, 500 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to sever arbi-
tration provision in consumer agreement prohibiting multiple damages); cf. Larry’s United 
Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that validity of dam-
ages limitation in business arbitration agreement was for arbitrator to decide). But see, e.g., 
Circuit City, 279 F.3d at 893-94 (finding unconscionable an arbitration provision imposed on 
employees in part because it limited the amount of damages and front and back pay). 
59. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobili-
ty LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 864 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
60. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
61. Id. at 699. 
62. 131 S. Ct. at 1749.  
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the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide ar-
bitration procedures.” The Court specifically ruled that the FAA preempted 
California’s Discover Bank rule, which prohibited class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts of adhesion, where likely disputes involved small amounts 
of damages and a party of superior bargaining power schemed to deliberately 
cheat consumers out of small sums of money.63 The coup de grace was the 
Court’s decision two terms ago in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restau-
rant.64 In that case, the Court held that the parties’ waiver of class arbitration 
procedures was enforceable under the FAA even though the plaintiffs’ claims 
would be prohibitively expensive to bring on an individual basis.65 
While the Court’s anti-class arbitration stance is by now well understood 
and fiercely debated by scholars,66 less well appreciated is the fundamental 
theoretical shift—one that extends well beyond the class action mechanism it-
self—that these more recent arbitration decisions reflect. This latest shift can be 
thought of as having two interrelated parts. First, the Court’s substantive con-
ception of arbitration as an expeditious, streamlined, and cost-effective dispute 
resolution process yielded to a reductionist view of arbitration as a contract for 
any form of private dispute resolution, whose procedures are entirely subject to 
the parties’ bargaining, no matter how ineffective in resolving the parties’ dis-
putes those procedures may be and (virtually67) no matter what burdens they 
 
63. Id. at 1744-46.  
64. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
65. Id. 
66. For examples of articles critical of the Supreme Court’s hostility to class arbitration, see 
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73 (2011); David L. 
Noll, Rethinking Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 680 (2012); Judith 
Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011); and Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 726 (2012). For a 
contrary view, see Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 630 (2012), which claims 
that these “critics should be significantly mollified by the monitoring function” that state at-
torneys general might come to play in the absence of a class dispute resolution mechanism. 
67. There are remnants of restrictions imposed by lower courts upon arbitration agreements of 
what scholars have deemed the “first-generation” sort—agreements that impose draconian 
conditions upon arbitration (such as requiring dispute resolution in a far-flung forum). See, 
e.g., Arnold v. Goldstar Fin. Sys., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15564, at *32-36 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 20, 2002) (finding an arbitration clause that would require financially distressed cus-
tomers to travel from Illinois to Florida unenforceable); see also Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding similar provisions in an employee contract unen-
forceable). These restrictions frequently are imposed under state doctrines of unconscionabil-
ity law. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1292-94 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that an arbitration agreement that imposed unreasonable costs on a California fran-
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may impose on one party or the other. Second, the Court’s recent arbitration 
jurisprudence ushered in a fundamental shift in the normative prerogatives 
that had long underlain its freedom-of-contract conception of arbitration, 
namely, that such freedom enabled private parties to change the mechanisms of 
adjudication, but not to change the scope of obligations under substantive 
law.68 Specifically, over the last five years, the Court jettisoned the notion, ex-
pressed in a number of prior opinions,69 that arbitration contracts would be 
struck down if they impaired parties’ ability to bring federal statutory claims. 
In so doing, the Court reduced federal substantive causes of action to mere 
formalities.  
1. The Shift from Arbitration as a Form of Streamlined Proceedings for 
Dispute Resolution to Solely a Matter of Contract 
Regarding the Court’s substantive conception of arbitration, the Court’s 
shift away from arbitration as a resolution-facilitative form of dispute resolu-
tion to arbitration as pure freedom of contract—freedom of contract divorced 
from the claim-facilitative function critical to the Court’s earlier arbitration ju-
risprudence70—has its seeds in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, but it culminated 
 
chisee by requiring her to arbitrate her claims in Massachusetts might be unconscionable 
under California law and remanding to the district court); Willis v. Nationwide Debt Set-
tlement Grp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1220-21 (D. Or. 2012) (finding a forum selection provi-
sion requiring plaintiffs to bring their claims in California unconscionable under Oregon 
law); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Green, 96 P.3d 1159 (Nev. 2004) (finding a penalty for refusing 
to arbitrate and fee-splitting provisions unconscionable under Nevada law); see also Alexan-
der v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (refusing to sever numerous un-
conscionable provisions that violated Virgin Islands contract law). Whether such “first-
generation” type clauses can be restricted in this way is arguably an open question, particu-
larly after AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. See Peter Coffman, Pendulum Still Swinging  
on Consumer Arbitration Clauses, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHTS (July 10, 2012), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/2012/07_-_July/Pendulum_still 
_swinging_on_consumer_arbitration_clauses [https://perma.cc/AH7N-94RA?type=pdf] 
(“[A]ssuming that the arbitration clause is prominently displayed and substantively even-
handed, it should be fine under Concepcion. It should not have to lean heavily in favor of the 
consumer and cases holding otherwise are likely unsound . . . . But, sound or unsound, such 
a clause may still be a lightning rod to lower courts, and most businesses would rather not 
be the test case.”).  
68. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.  
69. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“Hav-
ing made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has 
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at is-
sue. Nothing, in the meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the 
scope of an agreement to arbitrate.”).  
70. See supra Part I.  
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in Italian Colors. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court interpreted the parties’ stipulation 
that the agreement was “silent” as an acknowledgement that the parties had 
not agreed to class arbitration procedures and then went on to hold that, ab-
sent explicit agreement to arbitrate on a classwide basis, parties could not be 
compelled to do so.71 The Court’s strained interpretation of the stipulation 
gave it a platform to reaffirm the contractual nature of arbitration as “a matter 
of consent, not coercion.”72 It also gave the Court an opportunity, in the guise 
of discussing the arbitrator’s imposition of “policy choice[s]”73 on unwilling 
parties, to set out the Court’s own policy objections against class arbitration 
procedures.74 Indeed, the Court suggested in a somewhat cryptic footnote that 
class arbitration was objectionable even in the context of “negative value” 
claims that would not be economical to bring without the benefit of a class pro-
cedure.75 However, the uncoupling of freedom of contract and claim facilitation 
was not fully achieved in Stolt-Nielsen: it was a narrow decision that hinged on 
 
71. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). The Court went on 
at length about the ways in which class-wide proceedings were fundamentally at odds with 
the nature of arbitration:  
Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitra-
tion to class-action arbitration. An arbitrator chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure 
. . . no longer resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, but instead 
resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties . . . . Under 
the Class Rules [of the American Arbitration Association], ‘the presumption of privacy and 
confidentiality’ that applies in many bilateral arbitrations ‘shall not apply in class arbitra-
tions,’ . . . thus potentially frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbi-
trate. The arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitra-
tion agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well . . . . And the commercial 
stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, . . . even 
though the scope of judicial review is much more limited . . . . We think that the differences 
between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, con-
sistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue 
of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings. 
The dissent minimizes these crucial differences by characterizing the question before the ar-
bitrators as being merely what ‘procedural mode’ was available to present AnimalFeeds’ 
claims . . . . If the question were that simple, there would be no need to consider the parties’ 
intent with respect to class arbitration. . . . But the FAA requires more. Contrary to the dis-
sent, but consistent with our precedents emphasizing the consensual basis of arbitration, we 
see the question as being whether the parties agreed to authorize class arbitration.  
  Id. at 686-87 (internal citations omitted). 
72. Id. at 681 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).  
73. Id. at 677. 
74. Id. at 673-75, 686-87.  
75. Id. at 675 n.7 (internal citation omitted).  
  
the yale law journal 124:30 52   20 15  
3070 
 
the parties’ stipulation,76 and the Court appeared to leave open the possibility 
that class procedures could be presumed in arbitration pursuant to a back-
ground principle of state contract law.77  
The Court took a further step toward a vision of arbitration as pure free-
dom of contract, regardless of whether arbitration served as an efficient mech-
anism for resolving claims, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.78 Nonetheless, 
as a rhetorical matter, the Court continued to view freedom of contract and 
streamlined, efficient proceedings for resolving claims as mutually reinforcing, 
stating that “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the en-
forcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”79 And it reiterated that “[t]he point of affording parties 
discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, stream-
lined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”80 Indeed, the Court continued 
to suggest that it was operating under a baseline presumption that the occur-
rence of some form of proceedings—even if these proceedings took place in the 
private realm of arbitration—was the purpose that private arbitration was in-
tended to serve. But in holding that California’s Discover Bank rule was 
preempted,81 the Court suggested through its reasoning that freedom of con-
tract would trump any interest that the parties had in facilitating streamlined 
proceedings, or any interest that the parties had in having any proceedings 
whatsoever. In response to the dissent’s concern that the holding in Concepcion 
would prevent many plaintiffs from pursuing small-value claims,82 the Court 
responded that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with 
the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”83 By dismissing as “unre-
lated” to the FAA the interest in facilitating the pursuit of small-value claims, 
the Court’s dicta augured a shift in the Court’s view of the FAA’s policies as en-
 
76. The Court narrowed Stolt-Nielson to its facts in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 
2064, 2069 (2013). 
77. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 n.10 (“We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis 
may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration.”). 
78. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
79. Id. at 1748 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. at 1749.  
81. The Discover Bank rule prohibited class-action waivers in contracts of adhesion where “dis-
putes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and  
. . . it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme 
to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.” 
Id. at 1746 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162-63 (2005)). 
82. Id. at 1753 (“The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar 
claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system.”). 
83. Id. (emphasis added). 
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forcing the parties’ contractual choices, regardless of whether they resulted in 
“efficient, streamlined procedures” or, quite to the contrary, procedures that 
were onerous to the point of effectively extinguishing claims.  
In Italian Colors, the tension between freedom of contract and efficient 
claim-facilitating procedures reached its breaking point, and the Court resolved 
it squarely in favor of pure freedom of contract. The case came to the Court 
with a factual record demonstrating that because the parties had waived class 
arbitration procedures, it would be uneconomical for the vast majority of 
American Express’s merchants to assert an individual antitrust claim.84 The 
maximum value of the merchants’ claims was approximately $12,850, or 
$38,500 after trebling, while the estimated cost of an antitrust economist’s ex-
pert report was many times that amount—up to $1 million.85 Consequently, far 
from being an “efficient, streamlined” arbitration procedure that facilitated the 
efficient resolution of disputes, the parties’ arbitration made those claims whol-
ly uneconomical to bring.86 There would, under the arbitration contract at is-
sue, be no proceedings.87  
The Court’s answer was that the FAA mandates that courts “rigorously en-
force”88 the parties’ agreement as written, pure and simple, and that it was 
“[t]oo darn bad”89 (in the words of Justice Kagan’s dissent) that the proce-
dures under that contract would, instead of facilitating the efficient resolution 
of claims, effectively preclude plaintiffs from bringing their claims. There was 
no mention—as there had been as recently as two years earlier in Concepcion—
of the point that the FAA’s purpose was to enforce the parties’ agreement “so as 
to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”90 Nor was there any reprise of Concep-
cion’s statement that the “point” of contractual freedom “is to allow for effi-
cient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”91 The Court in Ital-
 
84. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
85. Id. at 2308. 
86. See id. at 2313 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the claims might be “economically in-
feasible”).  
87. Such an effect would not be limited to antitrust claims. For instance, claims under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) systematically tend to generate low-value claims because of the 
nature of its protected class: wage and hour employees. See Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate 
Treatment: How Income Can Affect the Level of Employer Compliance with Employment Statutes, 
5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 474-75 & n.260 (2001). As a consequence, “mechanisms 
that facilitate the economics of claiming are required” to bring about private enforcement of 
the FLSA. Glover, supra note 2, at 1184 (2012).  
88. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309. 
89. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
90. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
91. Id. at 1749 (emphasis added).  
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ian Colors thus subtly but definitively abandoned its descriptive and normative 
premise that freedom of contract was justified in the arbitration context be-
cause it would result in more cost-effective procedures for “settling” disputes92 
and, accordingly, effective enforcement of the federal statutory regime. In its 
place, the Court adopted a reductionist vision of arbitration as any set of private 
dispute resolution procedures chosen by the parties, no matter how onerous or 
inefficient, and it held that the FAA required courts to enforce whatever terms 
the parties chose. The Court’s decision therefore marked the end of arbitration 
as we know it. Its jurisprudence had fully evolved from one that had eroded the 
public realm to one that now also eroded the substantive law.  
2. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the “Effective Vindication” of Rights 
Principle 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors also effectuated a second, 
concomitant shift in its arbitration jurisprudence. In expanding the FAA to 
federal statutory claims, the Court had strongly suggested, if not squarely held, 
that the FAA’s pro-arbitration policies would yield if they frustrated the “effec-
tive vindication”93 of federal statutory rights. This was not stray dicta. The 
Court reiterated the point repeatedly in cases as recently as 2009.94 Implicit in 
the Court’s suggestion was that private dispute resolution procedures making 
 
92.  9. U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also supra note 43.  
93. The “effective-vindication” principle was understood as a “narrow, but essential safety 
valve” for ensuring that the “FAA’s broad policy in favor of arbitration does not eviscerate 
more specific federal statutory rights.” Brief of Respondents at 13, Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133). Under the rule, arbitration agreements 
could not preclude statutory causes of action altogether. Id. 
94. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Ran-
dolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (stating that arbitration agreements are enforceable “so 
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of ac-
tion in the arbitral forum”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (same). Lower courts had explicitly applied this principle as well. Kris-
tian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2006) (“Unless the arbitral forum provided 
by a given agreement provides for the fair and adequate enforcement of a party’s statutory 
rights, the arbitral forum runs afoul of [the] presumption [that arbitration is an adequate 
judicial substitute] and loses its claim as a valid alternative to traditional litigation.”); see also 
In re Am. Exp. Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “a vindication of 
statutory rights analysis[] is part of the federal substantive law of arbitrability”); Hadnot v. 
Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n.14 (5th Cir. 2003) (severing part of arbitration clause that pro-
scribed damages available under the statutory scheme); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., 
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “[w]hen an arbitration clause has 
provisions that defeat the remedial purpose of the statute . . . the arbitration clause is not en-
forceable” and language insulating employer from damages and equitable relief rendered 
clause unenforceable).  
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it effectively impracticable for plaintiffs to bring federal statutory claims would 
offend the underlying federal statutory regime.95 Under the “effective vindica-
tion” view, a federal statutory cause of action is not merely a formal right, but 
rather a right that calls for resolution and, if appropriate, a remedy.96 Because 
of the public interest in the enforcement of federal statutes, federal substantive 
law implicitly forbids private agreements with the effect of frustrating claims. 
As a result, harmonization of federal substantive law and the FAA requires that 
the FAA yield when the parties’ arbitration agreement effectively prevents the 
vindication of federal statutory rights.  
In Italian Colors, the Court all but eliminated this “effective vindication” 
principle. That principle, the Court said, had nothing to do with whether the 
parties’ arbitration agreement left the plaintiff with a practical means to pursue 
a federal statutory claim. Rather, the Court emphasized, that principle forbids 
only “prospective waiver[s] of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”97 In 
practical terms, then, the only type of provision the Court would acknowledge 
as being covered by this prohibition was a naked exculpatory clause, which is a 
provision “forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights.”98 The Court 
also said that the principle “would perhaps” cover filing and administrative fees 
that are so high as to make access to the arbitral forum impracticable.99 But its 
equivocation on the latter point appeared to reflect at most a grudging ac-
ceptance of the Court’s prior dictum to that effect in Green Tree Financial Corp. 
v. Randolph,100 and possibly even a willingness to retreat from that dictum in 
the future. 
The Court’s evisceration of the “effective vindication” principle reflects a 
critical conceptual move. In abandoning the idea that arbitration agreements 
cannot impair parties’ practical ability to bring federal statutory claims, the 
Court effectively reduced federal substantive causes of action to mere formali-
ties. In the Court’s words, federal statutes “do not guarantee an affordable pro-
cedural path to the vindication of every claim.”101 “[T]he fact that it is not 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute 
 
95. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
96. See supra note 26.  
97. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).  
98. Id. at 2310-11. 
99 Id. at 2310. 
100. 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (leaving open the possibility that “large arbitration costs could pre-
clude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum,” though it found the litigant had failed to produce enough evidence to render the arbi-
tration clause at issue unenforceable).  
101. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309.  
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the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”102 Here, the Court effectuat-
ed a subtle, but quite significant shift in lawmaking power. Specifically, in Ital-
ian Colors, the Court placed the power to craft potential plaintiffs’ path to vin-
dication of substantive rights, and by extension, power over the substantive 
law itself, not in the hands of public lawmaking bodies, but in the hands of 
private, would-be defendants.  
Thus, in one fell swoop, Italian Colors obliterated the twin conceptual pil-
lars that had served to justify the Court’s expansion of the FAA to federal statu-
tory rights over the preceding three decades. The FAA’s policy of enforcing ar-
bitration agreements “according to their terms” is no longer limited by the 
overriding purpose of facilitating more cost-efficient and streamlined proceed-
ings, and hence more expeditious private enforcement of federal law.103 Rather, 
the FAA now stands for pure procedural freedom of contract. And because the 
Court has now held that federal law provides mere formal rights, not proce-
dural guarantees, the parties’ arbitration procedures must be enforced even 
when they have the purpose and predictable effect of depriving a party of the 
realistic means to enforce federal law.  
i i .  the supreme court’s  arbitration revolution and the 
erosion of the substantive law 
The Supreme Court’s three-decade-long expansion of private arbitration 
has long been criticized for achieving what might be called an erosion in the 
public realm.104 However, the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence 
goes well beyond the oft-lamented transfer of the enforcement and develop-
ment of substantive law from a public to a private forum. In fact, this jurispru-
dence stretches further than achieving what some have described as the near-
total disappearance of the class action device.105 Although the Court’s jurispru-
 
102. Id. at 2309-11. There is, of course, a level of irony in the jurisprudence here: on the one 
hand, the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence stands for the proposition that federal 
statutes can be reduced essentially to pure economic transactions, divorced from any policy 
that would favor vindicating the underlying statutory values (for instance, free competition, 
non-discrimination, etc.). On the other hand, in Italian Colors, the Court explicitly rejected 
all economic arguments that these arbitration clauses are in some cases indistinguishable 
from explicit ex ante waivers of statutory rights. 
103. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011). 
104.  See, e.g., supra notes 21-21 and accompanying text.  
105.  Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 1616 (2015) (predicting that 
all businesses will eventually be able to shield themselves from class actions by using class 
action waivers); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise 
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (identifying class waivers as 
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dence has long been providing private entities with increased discretion to 
choose the means of enforcing substantive law, the decision in Italian Colors 
signaled a fundamental change. It gave these private entities a power anteced-
ent to enforcement of substantive law—a power more akin to lawmaking itself: 
Corporations, through arbitration provisions in contracts, can render legal ob-
ligations virtually inapplicable to any of the primary conduct associated with 
those contractual arrangements. In short, corporations now have the power, 
through contract, effectively to negate substantive law.106  
As the first part of this Section explains, the power of private parties to cal-
ibrate substantive legal obligations, now recognized by the Court, constitutes a 
significant step toward a largely unobserved and unobservable erosion of sub-
stantive law. Private parties can now use provisions in arbitration contracts to 
severely hinder or eliminate any claims against them under any number of fed-
eral statutes.107 Particularly given the crucial role of private enforcement in the 
effectuation of substantive legislative directives,108 the potential—and even the 
intent—of these contractual provisions is to erode these substantive laws from 
the books, with neither legislative repeal nor judicial imprimatur via statutory 
interpretation. Because this erosion of substantive law is frequently achieved 
 
part of a “new set of tools powerful enough to imperil the very viability of class actions in 
many—actually, most—areas of the law”). 
106. To be sure, Congress contemplates some level of non-enforcement when it enacts statutes, 
and Congress legislates against the reality that some private litigants may, for one reason or 
another (including procedural costs), choose not to pursue their claims. Against the back-
drop of the FAA, which was adopted to further streamline disputes and to make claiming 
more efficient and cost-effective, the private arbitration provisions sanctioned by the Court 
in Italian Colors turn that backdrop on its head. These private provisions in arbitration con-
tracts—themselves creations not of any lawmaking body, but of private, would-be defend-
ants—create a procedural backdrop of enforcement of substantive law precisely opposite that 
enacted by Congress.  
107. Though the claims in Italian Colors arose under the Sherman Act, 133 S. Ct. at 2308, the 
breadth of the holding in that case was not limited to claims under that statute. Id. at 2309-
11 (explaining that statutory rights may be preserved in name only: “the fact that it is not 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination 
of the right to pursue that remedy”). That decision, combined with the Court’s prior holding 
that arbitration agreements are enforceable even when federal statutory claims are in-
volved, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (“the streamlined 
procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive 
rights”), means that private parties can achieve the frustration or elimination of claims 
against them across the panoply of federal statutes.  
108. Glover, supra note 2, at 1146 (highlighting the importance of private enforcement as “a con-
sequence of deliberate statutory design, and, further, of functional limitations of public reg-
ulatory bodies’ ability to achieve regulatory objectives”). To be clear, to highlight private 
parties’ primary role in the regulatory landscape is not to deny the existence of public en-
forcement but to acknowledge the relatively minimal level of enforcement achievable by 
constrained public agencies.  
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through trans-substantive, poorly-understood provisions in private contracts 
of adhesion, it is a particularly unobservable and politically unaccountable 
method of achieving legal reform.  
Given the consequences of this jurisprudence for substantive law, the non-
transparent way in which private entities can erode substantive law is troubling 
for an additional reason. As the second part of this Section explains, though 
one might expect a great deal of public outcry in response to this jurisprudence, 
there are a number of obstacles standing in the way of either meaningful public 
response or meaningful reform. As a result, the Supreme Court’s recent arbi-
tration revolution, and the erosion of the substantive law it enabled, is likely 
here to stay.  
A. How the Court’s Recent Arbitration Revolution Threatens Substantive Law 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence, pri-
vate parties have significant power to control the scope of their legal obliga-
tions, with the effect (and likely intent) of using arbitration agreements to 
eliminate claims against them. As a consequence, these private arbitration con-
tracts, once understood as mechanisms for efficient resolution of disputes un-
der substantive law, are now instruments in the erosion of that law. Moreover, 
because these ends are achieved through the use of little-noticed and little-
understood procedural provisions in arbitration contracts, these private entities 
are largely able to hide the exercise of their significant power from the public.  
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Italian Colors dramatically undercuts two re-
lated principles: one, that the reworking of substantive law should be achieved 
by publicly accountable bodies, and two, that public disclosure and concomi-
tant public scrutiny should accompany attempts to effectuate changes in sub-
stantive legal obligations. Regarding the former, the wholesale freedom-of-
contract view cemented in Italian Colors means that companies or other poten-
tial defendants interested in limiting their obligations under various consumer 
protection laws, employment discrimination laws, antitrust laws, and securities 
laws, for instance, can effectively do so without lobbying Congress or relevant 
state legislatures for changes to those laws. They can do so even without 
achieving narrower interpretations of those laws in the courts. Instead, those 
entities can substantially alter, if not avoid, their legal obligations under any 
substantive legal regime109 through contracts containing arbitration clauses 
that make it extraordinarily unlikely, if not nearly impossible, for the private 
 
109. See generally supra note 67 (discussing that the Court’s full-throated adoption of a freedom-
of-contract interpretation of the FAA means that its opinion in Italian Colors is by no means 
limited to class action waivers).  
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enforcement apparatus established by those statutes to function.110 As the 
Court’s opinion in Italian Colors makes clear, such provisions are enforceable, 
period, and the fact that they may make it wholly impracticable for a plaintiff 
to vindicate its substantive rights is, as Justice Kagan put it in dissent, “too 
darn bad.”111  
Combine the broad freedom that private entities have been given to craft 
arbitration contracts as they see fit—regardless of whether the chosen provi-
sions are consistent with the formerly stated arbitration goals of efficient, cost-
effective dispute resolution—with the Court’s effective reduction of substantive 
legal obligations to purely formal rights. The troubling reality created by this 
combination is one in which private corporations are able to achieve, through 
contract, a nearly silent reworking112 of obligations under substantive law, 
wholly divorced from public, democratic processes typically associated with 
public lawmaking and changing.113 Corporations with the know-how to draft 
sophisticated arbitration clauses can limit liability without fundraising, politi-
cal contributions, advertising, petitioning Congress, or any of the normal activ-
ities of direct democratic reform. Moreover, because these private arbitration 
 
110. See Glover, supra note 2, at 1209-10 (discussing Congress’s explicit reliance on private liti-
gants for the enforcement of various substantive laws). Of course, there remains the enfee-
bled but not dead backstop of unconscionability. There may be instances in which uncon-
scionability doctrine could step in, without running afoul of Concepcion, to prohibit 
contractual provisions before such provisions went so far as to run afoul of American Express 
by, say, including statute-specific exculpation clauses.  
111. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
112. The reworking of substantive law in this way is, as I note, nearly silent—nearly for two rea-
sons. First, any reworking of substantive obligations is not totally silent inasmuch as the 
non-drafting party could (and sometimes would) note the presence of an arbitration clause 
in the contract. However, the mere presence of such a clause does little to reveal the larger 
gambit, which is for the contract drafter, in many cases, not to arbitrate disputes, but to 
eliminate disputes altogether. Second, the contract drafter’s substantive legal obligations are 
not eliminated when arbitration is, in fact, cost-effective for aggrieved individuals who take 
their claims to arbitration. On that score, I leave to the side the open empirical question 
about whether there are meaningful differences between an arbitral forum and a court vis-à-
vis the resolution of substantive rights in favor of the contract drafter. See, e.g.,  
Robert Berner, Big Arbitration Firm Pulls Out of Credit Card Business, BUS. WEEK (July 19,  
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/investing/wall_street_news_blog/archives/2009/07 
/big_arbitration.html [http://perma.cc/E3DL-YMU4] (reporting that the National Arbitra-
tion Forum agreed to get out of the credit-card arbitration business after settling lawsuits al-
leging increased bias towards major credit-card companies in credit card dispute resolu-
tion).  
113. Moreover, short of a congressional sea change of opinion on the broader issue of whether 
the law should permit employee, consumer, franchise contracts, and the like to require arbi-
tration and, in particular, one-on-one arbitration, corporations need not even make cam-
paign contributions with the arbitration issue in mind.  
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contracts are now subject to only the most superficial judicial review,114 the ef-
fect of these clauses in many cases—namely, to recalibrate the extent of a con-
tract drafter’s substantive legal obligations under various federal statutes—will 
not be revealed to the public through judicial opinions. Italian Colors is there-
fore nothing less than a recipe for self-deregulation—a Do-It-Yourself guide 
for private parties to achieve legal reform through private contracts115 wholly 
outside the democratic process. Insofar as many of the chosen contractual pro-
visions have the effect—and, as one would expect from a rational drafting par-
ty, the intention—of recalibrating the scope of potential liability under particu-
lar substantive statutes, that effect is now achievable with nary a ripple in the 
water of public consciousness.  
Regarding the second principle—that public disclosure and concomitant 
public scrutiny should accompany attempts to effectuate changes in substan-
tive legal obligations—the decision in Italian Colors is equally troubling. In a 
traditional democratic government, a citizen wanting to reduce or eliminate his 
or her legal obligations is usually required to do so both in a transparent way, 
and with the approval of governmental bodies tasked with writing or interpret-
ing substantive laws. The most obvious way to do so is to lobby the legislature 
to amend or repeal the law that creates the obligation. For instance, many enti-
ties have successfully convinced state legislatures to repeal or to refrain from 
enacting substantive statutes viewed as unfriendly to business,116 or to amend 
 
114. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 
2064 (2013). 
115. For purposes of this piece, I presume, as the Court did even in Italian Colors, that federal 
statutes are not rules around which private parties can contract. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1972) (arguing that inalienability rules properly account 
for the difficulty of valuing external costs to entitlements, whereas property and liability 
rules do not). 
116. Just last year, businesses successfully lobbied the New York State Legislature to repeal part 
of the state’s Wage Theft Prevention Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney 2014), which 
formerly required businesses to issue a wage rate notice to employees in the beginning of 
each year. Governor Cuomo signed the reform, S. 5885-B, into law on December 29,  
2014. See New York Employers Relieved of Annual Wage Theft Prevention Act Notice  
Requirement, NAT’L L. REV., Jan. 13, 2015, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york 
-employers-relieved-annual-wage-theft-prevention-act-notice-requirement [http://perma 
.cc/YS5A-7EJE]. Lobbying efforts have been especially successful at achieving repeals of 
harmful legislation in the tax arena. For example, businesses in Michigan, including the 
state’s chamber of commerce, effectuated the repeal of a sales tax on services within seven-
teen hours of its passage. Andrew Ironside, Omen for Ohio? Michigan’s Sales Tax on Service 
Repealed 17 Hours After Taking Effect, INNOVATION OHIO (Mar. 11, 2013), http:// 
innovationohio.org/2013/03/11/omen-for-ohio-michigans-sales-tax-on-service-repealed-17 
-hours-after-taking-effect [http://perma.cc/Z972-NNAV]; Michigan Chamber Calls  
on Policymakers To Reject Sales Tax on Services, MICH. CHAMBER (Dec. 12,  
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existing statutes to limit the extent of liability under them by adding, for in-
stance, damages caps and the like.117 However normatively troubling (or not) 
one finds such legal changes, they were ultimately brought about by traditional 
lawmaking bodies and achieved through processes that yielded public infor-
mation both about these changes and about the parties responsible for effectu-
ating them. Such transparency at least theoretically invites public scrutiny at 
the ballot box.  
Alternatively, persons or entities dissatisfied with the contours of their ob-
ligations under substantive law, particularly insofar as those obligations arise 
from judge-made rules or judicial interpretations of a given statute or provi-
 
2014), http://michamber.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=19845&item=137208 [http://perma 
.cc/4MCZ-Y46W]. The Minnesota Chamber of Commerce lobbied successfully for the re-
peal of three sales taxes on business-to-business transactions. Business Taxes Repealed!, 
MINN. CHAMBER COMM. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.mnchamber.com/advocate/business-
taxes-repealed [https://perma.cc/W459-3SGD]. And, finally, the North Carolina Chamber 
successfully lobbied for the repeal of a local privilege tax. 2014 NC Chamber Annual Report,  
N.C. CHAMBER 7 (2014), http://ncchamber.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NC-Chamber 
-14-01-Annual-Report-2014-LR.pdf [http://perma.cc/HFR6-LT8M]. Further, businesses 
across the country have achieved business-friendly legal reform through the lobbying efforts 
of statewide chambers of commerce—efforts that successfully prevented the passage of laws 
viewed as harmful to business. See, e.g., 2014 Major Victories, CAL. CHAMBER COMM., 
http://www.calchamber.com/AboutUs/Documents/2014-major-victories.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/28JB-YQ4S] (noting that SB 1381, a bill that would have tightened and created a private 
right of action for California labeling requirements, was defeated); 2014 Legislative Victories 
and Defeats for New Hampshire Business, BUS. & INDUSTRY ASS’N N.H., http://www 
.biaofnh.com/newsroom/publications.aspx [http://perma.cc/2ZQR-QKB7] (noting that HB 
1403, a bill that would have increased the state minimum wage, died in the Senate); The Re-
sults: The 2013 Lobbying Report of the Texas Legislature 83rd Regular and Special Session, TEX. 
ASS’N BUS. 10,(2013) http://www.txbiz.org/advocacy/publications.aspx [http://perma.cc 
/6BYP-Z5NF] (noting that three bills, HB 318, SB 118, and HB 451, that would have pre-
vented employer access to employee company accounts for “suspicion of conduct contrary to 
company policy or criminal in nature,” were defeated); 2014 Legislative Review, ASS’N WASH. 
BUS. (2015), http://www.awb.org/2013voterecord [http://perma.cc/LT9Q-VQSR] (noting 
that 2SHB 2333, a bill that would have liberalized and imposed criminal liability for alleged 
anti-retaliation claims against employers, died in the Senate).  
117. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2014) (providing for a damages cap in medical mal-
practice actions); 23 OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)(2) (2014) (capping punitive damages at 
one hundred thousand dollars or the amount of actual damages); FAM. CT. ACT § 245(b) 
(McKinney 2014) (setting compensation caps, provided in N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35 (McKinney 
2014), for lawyers who represent indigent children and adults); NJBIA Legislative Successes, 
N.J. BUS. & INDUSTRY ASS’N, http://www.njbia.org/issues-and-advocacy/legsuccess.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/7H2L-LR4Z] (noting that three bills, A-3050/S-2327, A3123/S-2326, A-
3049/S-2328, strengthening corporations’ ability to avoid state shareholder derivative suits, 
were signed into law). Other procedural limitations of liability, such as statutes of limita-
tions, directly, and often intentionally, affect substantive rights. See generally Donna A. Bos-
well, Comment, The Parameters of Federal Common Law: The Case of Time Limitations on Fed-
eral Causes of Action, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1447 (1988).  
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sion, have typically found potential recourse through the courts. Indeed, liti-
gants may argue for any number of things that would decrease their exposure 
to liability: for narrower interpretations of their obligations under particular 
statutes, interpretations of statutes that exclude particular enforcers from the 
litigation landscape,118 and heightened standards of proof,119 just to name a few.  
Both of these avenues for recalibrating one’s obligations under the substan-
tive law—through either the legislative or judicial processes—occur openly, in 
terms of both public visibility and some measure of democratic accountability. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently highlighted the importance of transparen-
cy and public scrutiny in the democratic lawmaking process. Even in what is 
one of the (arguably) most pro-corporate decisions regarding the democratic 
process in years, the Court emphasized the importance of subjecting to public 
scrutiny attempts to effectuate substantive legal change through support of po-
litical candidates. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,120 the Court 
held that bans on independent corporate expenditures on political campaigns 
are unconstitutional, insofar as such spending is a form of protected speech 
under the First Amendment. The Court nevertheless made clear that public 
disclosures were crucial to such an unregulated campaign finance system. First, 
the Court noted, restricting corporate donations to political campaigns was a 
relic of a bygone age, of a pre-internet “system without adequate disclosure.”121 
Since the informational world had changed, the Court reasoned, bans on con-
 
118. For example, the “Indirect Purchaser Rule” under federal antitrust law typically prevents 
indirect purchasers from bringing antitrust actions. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 
745-46 (1977). Some states have legislated around the rule to give indirect purchasers stand-
ing to sue. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1975); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) 
(West 2008); D.C. CODE § 28-4509(a) (2011); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (West 
2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.778 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (2010); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-3(A) (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-1-33 
(2011); WIS. STAT. § 133.18(1)(a) (2011).  
119. Indeed, just this last term, Halliburton challenged a long-standing judicial interpretation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. 
Under Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Court had held that investors in a class 
action could satisfy the reliance element of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by invoking a 
presumption that the price of stock traded in an efficient market. Halliburton challenged the 
validity and availability of this long-standing presumption, arguing instead that investors 
should be required to show that alleged misrepresentations had actually affected the stock 
price. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014). While the 
Court declined Halliburton’s invitation to overrule Basic’s presumption of reliance, it agreed 
with Halliburton that defendants must be afforded the opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion of reliance prior to the class certification decision with evidence of a lack of price im-
pact. Id. at 2414-17. 
120. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
121. Id. at 370.  
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tributions were no longer justifiable on such grounds. Second, the Court went 
on to discuss the importance of public disclosure of campaign contributions by 
corporate entities, emphasizing that “disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to 
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages.”122 Indeed, since such transparency, at least when pre-
sent,123 helps enable the public to connect the dots between the legislative inter-
ests of given donors with particular legislators—in other words, to discern var-
ious entities’ interests in effectuating particular legislative goals and/or legal 
change—the Court satisfied itself that any potential undue influence of such 
financial contributions on lawmakers or the lawmaking process would be 
blunted.124  
The decision in Italian Colors, however, created a regime that enables and 
even incentivizes companies and other defendants to shroud private reform of 
substantive law in an extraordinarily non-transparent manner by using “mere-
ly” procedural provisions. Indeed, the only sort of provision that the Court in 
Italian Colors reaffirmed as unenforceable under the FAA was an explicit excul-
patory clause. For instance, an arbitration contract would not survive judicial 
scrutiny were it to proclaim that “[X Corporation] shall not be liable under 
[federal statute].” Although such an explicit provision is not included, corpora-
tions may be able to achieve virtually the same effect through the procedural 
back door. Any procedural limitation, no matter how draconian, apparently is 
fair game under the FAA after Italian Colors. Indeed, after Italian Colors, it 
would be irrational for legal advisors not to insulate their corporate clients from 
private enforcement of substantive laws in the ways permitted under the Su-
preme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. And while there may still be limited 
room for states to limit procedural gamesmanship under unconscionability 
doctrine, unconscionability law is a highly imperfect tool, as I have explained 
 
122. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).  
123. I do not mean to overstate the point about transparency in campaign finance law, which by 
no means guarantees full transparency vis-à-vis the fingerprints behind particular legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 
13 ELECTION L.J. 160 (2014) (noting that unfair and improper influence on legislation by 
lobbyists and new lobbying practices may call for new laws regulating lobbying and cam-
paign finance activity).  
124. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“The First Amend-
ment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to 
the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to 
make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”). 
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elsewhere125–and it is even more so now in light of the constraints placed on it 
by the Court in Concepcion.126  
One striking consequence of the Court’s decision in Italian Colors is there-
fore that it not only facilitates legal reform through private contracts, but also 
encourages the reform to take place in such a way as to avoid the public and 
political spotlight. At least an express exculpatory provision might capture the 
public’s attention were it to appear in an arbitration contract. Ironically, then, 
from a transparency perspective, precisely such an explicit exculpatory provi-
sion could capture the attention of someone signing an arbitration agreement 
and reveal a company’s underlying strategic gambit—that the idea behind these 
arbitration clauses is not just to move dispute resolution to private fora, but in 
some instances, to eliminate the possibility of dispute resolution entirely. But if 
exculpation is buried in the fine print of a maze of difficult-to-understand pro-
cedural provisions, then the result is private legal reform largely removed from 
public scrutiny as well as judicial scrutiny.  
Imagine what would have to occur if drafters of arbitration agreements that 
eliminate class actions for employment discrimination lawsuits were to pursue 
that reform through the democratic process. They would have to lobby Con-
gress or promote relief in court or—less obviously, but still quite saliently—
seek a change in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because of the 
Court’s recent arbitration revolution, none of that is necessary. The only paper 
 
125. See Glover, supra note 4, at 1738 (“[U]nconscionability doctrine is an imperfect tool . . . in 
that it fails to capture the core concerns attendant to class action waivers.”).  
126. One exceptional, but notable, source of pushback against the Supreme Court’s recent arbi-
tration cases has come from the jurisprudence of Justice Goodwin Liu of the California Su-
preme Court. Liu has repeatedly narrowed the reach of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Concepcion and Italian Colors, as applied to arbitration class action waivers. Most recently, 
Liu wrote for the court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 
2014), cert. denied, No. 14-341, Jan. 20, 2015, upholding state law preclusion of waivers of 
group claims for penalties against an employer under California’s Private Attorneys General 
Act (PAGA), on the basis that a PAGA lawsuit is not the kind of purely private dispute Con-
cepcion found preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 149. In both Iskanian and an 
earlier putative employment class action, Liu distinguished Italian Colors as a case about the 
harmonization of the FAA with federal law–namely antitrust law–not preemption of state 
unconscionability rules. Id. at 141; Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 209 (Cal. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014). In Moreno, Liu similarly limited Concepcion’s reach 
to its own narrow language. Finding that “[s]tate-law rules that do not ‘interfere[] with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration’ do not implicate Concepcion’s limits on state unconscion-
ability rules,” Liu created a judicial rule that adhesive arbitration agreements compelling the 
surrender of certain procedural protections as a condition of employment must provide for 
an alternative accessible, affordable resolution of wage disputes. Id. at 206 (emphasis add-
ed). Such a limitation on adhesive contracts that does not get to such “fundamental attrib-
utes,” Liu argued, is a permissible use of state unconscionability doctrine even after Concep-
cion. Id. at 206-07. 
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trail that corporations leave in their efforts to reduce or eliminate their legal ob-
ligations are fine-print contracts of adhesion, which are rarely read by the aver-
age consumer or employee, let alone understood as effectively exculpatory for 
the drafter. The provisions themselves hardly raise a specter of suspicion re-
garding the corporation’s underlying strategic gambit to recalibrate the extent 
of liability and obligation under various substantive laws. Indeed, had Italian 
Colors allowed corporations to include contractual clauses that explicitly excul-
pated them from liability under particular laws, at least the public’s attention 
might have been captured. To put the point slightly differently, the Supreme 
Court’s prohibition on blatant exculpatory clauses does little good on this 
score: were contract drafters to include such explicit provisions, the strategic 
gambit of recalibrating substantive obligations would be quite obvious, and as 
such, more likely to incite public backlash. As it stands now, corporations can 
whittle down their potential liability almost as well with contractual arbitration 
clauses, and very few contract signers will be the wiser.  
B. Why the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Revolution and the Erosion of 
Substantive Law Are Likely Here To Stay  
If the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence is, as I have contended, a recipe for 
self-deregulation, largely unchecked by democratic processes, then surely there 
would be public outcry at the Court’s decisions and sustained efforts to undo 
the damage through statutory amendment.127 After all, Stolt-Nielsen, Concep-
cion, and Italian Colors are not constitutional decisions;128 they interpret the 
FAA, which Congress is free to change. But the public outcry over these deci-
sions has been muted at best. Yes, there have been some congressional hear-
ings. Yes, Senator Franken reintroduced (yet again) the Arbitration Fairness 
 
127. Alternatively, some have contended that gaps in enforcement of substantive legal obligations 
could be filled by governmental entities. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 66, at 660 
(“[S]tate attorneys general—alone among public enforcers—have the ability to fill the void 
left by class actions, primarily through expanded use of the parens patriae powers that are 
currently on the books in most states. Parens patriae suits are not subject to Rule 23 or con-
tractual waiver provisions, and so avoid the majority of impediments to contemporary class 
actions.”). However, as I have noted in prior work, government resources are quite limited, 
and both Congress and government agencies rely on private parties to serve as “attorneys 
general” in the enforcement apparatus for a number of substantive rights. See Glover, supra 
note 2, at 1151-52. 
128. Of course, it might well be said that the Court’s recent arbitration cases have a constitutional 
dimension. As others have argued, the Court’s increasing embrace of pure freedom of con-
tract in the arbitration setting is reminiscent of Lochner-era due process jurisprudence. See 
Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 19 at 807.  
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Act (this time, of 2013).129 And yes, Congress did discuss the issue seriously 
during its debates on the Dodd-Frank Act, ultimately deciding to direct the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to study the issue and to sub-
mit a report to back to Congress.130 But by and large, there has been no serious 
legislative push to overturn the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. Why? 
 
129. Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013). In fact, despite the Court’s ever-
broadening interpretations of the FAA in the years after Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427 
(1953), interpretations which extended the reach of the Act to various sorts of contracts orig-
inally considered off-limits by the bill’s signers, the FAA has never been amended. Moreo-
ver, the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA), which constitutes the only attempt to amend the 
FAA and which has gone through various iterations over the course of the past six years, has 
never even garnered a single committee vote in either the House or Senate. Other attempts 
to reform arbitration have met with little more success. Based on a study by Thomas V. 
Burch, of the 139 bills introduced between 1995 and 2010 related to arbitration, almost all 
died in committee. Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 
1309, 1332-33, 1355-76. The few that passed applied only to narrow categories of disputes. 
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Dispute Resolution Process, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 
(2012). 
130. On March 10, 2015, the CFPB issued the final report of its Arbitration Study. Arbitration 
Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (2015), http://files.consumerfinance 
.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/R5FX 
-RX64]. The report set forth a number of findings, including: (1) Arbitration agreements 
are pervasive, affecting eighty million consumers in the credit card market alone, id. at Sec-
tion 2: How Prevalent Are Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses and What Are Their Main Fea-
tures? 7, fn. 19; (2) approximately 90 percent of arbitration provisions studied expressly 
prohibit class arbitrations, id. at Preliminary 2013 Results 13; (3) arbitration clauses have not 
produced lower prices for consumers, see id. at Section 1: Introduction and Executive Sum-
mary 18; (4) consumer understanding of arbitration is minimal—three in four consumers 
did not know whether they were subject to an arbitration provision and less than seven per-
cent of consumers realized that an arbitration provision meant that they could not sue their 
credit card issuer in court, id. at Section 3: What Do Consumers Understand About Dispute 
Resolution Systems? 22, 4. The report has generated calls by consumer groups for the CFPB 
to ban the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in contracts for consumer financial 
products. See, e.g., Chris Morran, In the Wake of Arbitration Report, Consumer Advocates Ask 
CFPB To Revoke Banks’ “License To Steal,” CONSUMERIST (March 10, 2015), http:// 
consumerist.com/2015/03/10/in-wake-of-arbitration-report-consumer-advocates-ask-cfpb 
-to-revoke-banks-license-to-steal [http://perma.cc/BUJ5-CZYZ]. However, attacks on the 
CFPB’s data began almost immediately after the issuance of the report. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Lloyd, et al., The CFPB’s Final Report on Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVI-
SOR (March 17, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-cfpbs-final-report-on-pre 
-dispute-a-96733 [http://perma.cc/D8QZ-C2AV] (advising the consumer financial services 
industry to rebut the CFPB’s findings by identifying flawed or missing data, and pointing 
out specific data points the CFPB did not “fully consider[]”). Moreover, there may be signif-
icant limits—legal and political—to the CFPB’s ability to curtail the use of these agreements. 
For starters, there may be legal challenges to (1) the CFPB’s enforcement and rulemaking 
authority prior to Director Rich Cordray’s July 2013 Senate confirmation, see The  
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Its Foundation, Authorities, and First Year of  
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Divided government is, of course, part of the answer. With the Republi-
cans in control of the House of Representatives, the odds of congressional pas-
sage of an amendment to the FAA are slim.131 But part of the answer also lies in 
 
Enforcement, GIBSON DUNN (June 5, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages 
/ConsumerFinancial-ProtectionBureau-Foundation-Authorities-First-Year-of-Enforcement 
.aspx#_ftn39 [http://perma.cc/N4Q9-BUT8] (observing that, under § 1022 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, only a lawfully-appointed director “may prescribe rules, issue orders and guid-
ance”); (2) the constitutional authority of the CFPB to issue rules exempting contracts from 
the Federal Arbitration Act, see Alan Kaplinsky, CA Federal Court Rejects Challenge to CFPB’s 
Constitutionality, CFPB MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2014 
/01/15/ca-federal-court-rejects-challenge-to-cfpbs-constitutionality [http://perma.cc/9U2U 
-49LD] (noting such a challenge will only be ripe once the CFPB issues final rules banning 
or regulating arbitration provisions); or (3) the sufficiency of the CFPB’s data itself, see Ali-
son Frankel, CFPB Arbitration Study a Powerful Vindication of Consumer Class Actions, REU-
TERS (March 10, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/03/10/cfpb-arbitration 
-study-a-powerful-vindication-of-consumer-class-actions [http://perma.cc/AA6C-W5CW] 
(interviewing Ballard Spahr’s Alan Kaplinsky, who criticized the data’s failure to address ei-
ther the number of non-settled class actions where plaintiffs recovered nothing or how 
much, in settled cases, individual class members actually recovered); Consumer Financial 
Services Group, The CFPB’s Final Arbitration Study: What’s the Real Story?, BALLARD SPAHR 
LLP (March 11, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015 
-03-11-the-cfpbs-final-arbitration-study-whats-the-real-story.aspx [http://perma.cc/XWK4 
-GH6S] (arguing that, in fact, the CFPB’s “study confirms that arbitration does benefit con-
sumers” as a faster, more affordable form of dispute resolution). Moreover, ongoing politi-
cal challenges to the CFPB’s authority include a bill, introduced on March 5, 2015, to change 
the CFPB’s single-director structure to a board with greater congressional oversight. Finan-
cial Product Safety Commission Act, H.R. 1266, 114th Cong. (2015). 
131. All iterations of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) in both chambers were proposed, and 
almost exclusively supported, by Democrats. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 
113th Cong. (2013) (proposed by Rep. Hank Johnson, D-GA-4, with no Republican co-
sponsors); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposed by Sen. Al 
Franken, D-MN, with twenty-three Democrats and one independent co-sponsoring); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposed by Rep. Hank John-
son, D-GA-4, with no Republican co-sponsors); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 
112th Cong. (2011) (proposed by Sen. Al Franken, D-MN, with sixteen Democrats and one 
independent co-sponsoring); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (proposed by Rep. Hank Johnson, D-GA-4; only one of 118 co-sponsors was a Re-
publican); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by Sen. 
Russ Feingold, D-WI, with thirteen Democrats co-sponsoring); Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposed by Rep. Hank Johnson, D-GA-4; 99 of 103 
co-sponsors were Democrats),; Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(proposed by Sen. Russ Feingold, D-WI, with seven Democrats co-sponsoring). Moreover, 
Republican skepticism and outright hostility to the AFA has been well documented in com-
mittee hearings and in the media. See, e.g., The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: 
Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of Consumers, Workers, and Small 
Businesses?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 43-44 (2013), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHRG-113shrg89563.pdf [http://perma 
.cc/M45G-6GN3] (prepared statements of Sens. Grassley and Hatch, both expressing their 
views that, even with class waivers, arbitration clauses would still be a superior alternative to 
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the brilliance of pursuing deregulatory reform through the interpretation of the 
FAA. As William Eskridge found in a landmark study, overriding the Court’s 
statutory decisions is always a difficult business. Even “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
most controversial statutory decisions are usually not overridden because there 
are strong interest group alignments on both sides of the issues, leaving the 
Court’s decisions firmly intact.”132 But such overrides are virtually impossible if 
those critical of the Court’s decision lack a concentrated political constituency 
ready to use its clout in the political process. This finding is wholly consistent 
with a longstanding political science literature recognizing that interest groups 
with a narrow focus are more politically influential than diffuse groups orga-
nized for the achievement of broad goals.133 Interest groups with an expansive 
membership and a nebulous focus run the risk that potential members will de-
cide to let someone else advocate for them, hoping to free ride on the efforts of 
more involved patrons of the group.134 On the other hand, members of groups 
with fewer participants and a narrower focus have a greater individual stake in 
advocating for their goals, meaning that efficacy increases as focus narrows.135  
These political realities mean that amending the FAA is an extremely diffi-
cult political task.136 To begin with, arbitration is not the kind of thing that the 
 
litigation); Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using It To Quash Legal 
Claims?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009), http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/111th 
/111-39_49475.PDF [http://perma.cc/SJ8Q-WTS5] (statement of Rep. Darrell Issa, R-CA, 
opposing the AFA’s supposed effort to “preempt[] the ability for companies to offer a con-
tract and individuals to choose that contract”); Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback:  
Supreme Court’s Anti-Consumer Rulings Trigger Democratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.  
20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisions 
-democratic-bills_n_1022207.html [http://perma.cc/TEP3-YEWY]. 
132. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 377 (1991).  
133. The foundational text for this assertion is MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE AC-
TION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971), which began to dominate the dis-
cussion of interest groups in America around mid-1970. See Iain McLean, The Divided Legacy 
of Mancur Olson, 30 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 651, 653 (2000). 
134. OLSON, supra note 133 at 53-65 (discussing the different incentives for action at play in large 
interest groups with broad interests and smaller interest groups with one-issue goals).  
135. Id.  
136. There have been precious few amendments made to the FAA. See Burch, supra note 129, at 
1334-35 (citing five exceptions where the FAA has been amended: Motor Vehicle Franchise 
Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (exempting car dealers 
from the FAA); John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 10 
U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2012) (exempting military personnel and their dependents); Food, Con-
servation, and Energy Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 197c (2012) (exempting parties to livestock 
and poultry contracts); “Franken Anti-Rape Amendment,” Department of Defense Appro-
priations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118 § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3455 (2012) (prohibiting 
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American public gets worked up about. Its political salience is extremely low. 
As the Court is fond of saying, arbitration is merely a shift in forum, from the 
courts to private arbitrators. In theory, it does not affect one’s substantive 
rights; it merely dictates how and by whom those rights will be resolved. 
Moreover, the FAA is trans-substantive; it does not mention a single, specific 
substantive statute. And ever since the Court’s expansion of the FAA to all fed-
eral and state-law claims, it does not relate specifically to any particular politi-
cal constituency: it covers employees, consumers, and businesses alike, and it 
covers virtually all substantive legal claims. The fact that the FAA does not, on 
its face, target any particular group or substantive right means that the Court’s 
arbitration cases were largely shunted to the less salient realm of “procedural” 
cases, which may have an enormous impact on substantive rights but do not 
garner the public attention that cases directly involving such rights often do.  
The Court’s pleading decisions (Twombly137 and Iqbal138) and its more re-
cent class-action decisions in Wal-Mart v. Dukes139 and Comcast v. Behrend140 
are good examples of this phenomenon. As with the Court’s arbitration juris-
prudence, those decisions were met with hue and cry from some quarters,141 
but they ultimately encountered limited resistance in the democratically elected 
branches of government. Compare those cases, on the one hand, to cases that 
directly implicate the substantive rights of a specific group, on the other. In the 
 
government contracts with employers from requiring arbitration of Title VII or sexual har-
assment claims); and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2012) (giving the SEC authority to restrict or prohibit manda-
tory arbitration in the securities context)). 
137. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
138. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
139. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
140. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
141. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in A Post-Concepcion 
Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1221-22 (2012); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The 
Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011), 
http://www.northwesternlawreview.org/online/how-goliath-won-future-implications-
dukes-v-wal-mart [http://perma.cc/NM2G-E4YL] (“By redefining the class certification re-
quirements for employment discrimination cases in two major areas . . . [this ruling] com-
promises employees’ access to justice.”); Resnik, supra note 66, at 93 (“AT&T and Wal-
Mart insisted on disaggregation, devolution, and privatization . . . predicated on Justices’ 
own impressionistic senses of both the costs and benefits of using particular procedures. 
Not much analyzed were constitutional stipulations of courts as constitutional entitlements 
available to everyone, including litigants of limited means, or the remarkable success courts 
have had in attracting a high level of demand for and in obtaining a significant amount of 
public and private investment in their services, or courts’ role as contributors to democratic 
lawmaking.”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Op-Ed, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, 
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-case-
could-end-class-action-suits-3246898.php [http://perma.cc/4GF5-A4C4]. 
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wake of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,142 for example, which explicitly 
involved employment discrimination law—in particular, the equal pay provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—public outcry over the decision was so 
great143 that Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 to pro-
vide that the statute of limitations for filing equal pay claims resets with each 
new paycheck affected by the employer’s discriminatory action.144 Likewise, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,145 which 
allows closely held for-profit corporations to obtain religious exemption from 
providing employees with contraceptives, as mandated by the Affordable Care 
Act, has led to extraordinary public outcry.146 It has even led to the introduc-
tion of Senate Bill 2578, the Protect Women’s Health From Corporate Interfer-
ence Act.147  
In fact, the Court’s FAA jurisprudence creates a political dynamic that sys-
tematically favors large corporations, the “winners” in the Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence, over those who enter into arbitration agreements (the “los-
ers”).148 On the one hand, repeat-player large corporations and other commer-
 
142. 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding that the statute of limitations for presenting an equal-pay law-
suit begins on the date that the employer makes the initial discriminatory wage decision, not 
the date of the most recent paycheck).  
143. See, e.g., Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2007/05/31/opinion/31thu1.html [http://perma.cc/5J65-4WVF] (noting that “[f]ortunately, 
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cial contract drafters with substantial market power have a vested interest in 
drafting self-deregulatory clauses and in protecting the interpretation of the 
FAA that enables them to do so. On the other hand, the impact of those con-
tracts is felt by many members of the public on a wide swath of issues, which 
actually renders any action by the public against these decisions difficult and 
unlikely.149  
The testimony before Congress in hearings on the un-enacted Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007 (AFA) bears out this point. In their testimony, AFA oppo-
nents generally expressed blanket support for pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
Specifically, their arguments coalesced around the following concentrated ar-
guments and principles: (1) arbitration agreements are voluntary consumer 
contracts;150 (2) arbitration is more efficient, flexible, and accessible than litiga-
tion;151 (3) the “little-guy” more often than not prevails, be it through volun-
 
149. Even if, as Eskridge postulates, “losers” did have enough clout to petition Congress to 
change the FAA, there is a bias in favor of the status quo. Eskridge, supra note 132, at 377 
(“The Supreme Court’s most controversial statutory decisions are usually not overridden 
because there are strong interest group alignments on both sides of the issues, leaving the 
Court’s decisions firmly intact.”). 
150. Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
2-4 (2011) (statement of Christopher R. Drahozal, John M. Rounds Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Kansas School of Law), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11-10-
13DrahozalTestimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/93QT-CN8V] [hereinafter Drahozal Testimo-
ny]; Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 3-4, 10-11 (2011) (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11-10-13SchwartzTestimony.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z3S2-5U35] [hereinafter Schwartz Testimony]; S. 1782: The Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Judiciary Committee, 
110th Cong. 2-3 (2007) (statement of Peter B. Rutledge, Associate Professor, Columbus  
Sch. of Law, Catholic Univ. of America), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media 
/doc/Rutledge%20Testimony%20121207.pdf [http://perma.cc/SC8H-NMGT] [hereinafter 
Rutledge Testimony].  
151. Drahozal Testimony, supra note 150, at 10-11; Schwartz Testimony, supra note 150, at 5-8; 
The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under-
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the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 4-14 (2013) (statement of Archis A. Parasharami, Partner,  
Mayer Brown LLP), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12-17-13Parasharami 
Testimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2YU-5PXQ] [hereinafter Parasharami Testimony]; S. 
1782: The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2-3 (2007) (statement of Richard Naimark, Senior  
Vice President, American Arbitration Association), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo 
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tary settlement or arbitration;152 (4) the AFA would functionally abolish arbi-
tration, imposing substantial costs on consumers, employers, employees, and 
businesses;153 and (5) post-dispute arbitration agreements are an illusory alter-
native.154 At bottom, this anti-AFA cohesion sprung from near-total support for 
the FAA’s broad scope. As Richard Naimark of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation testified, “[t]he FAA is a piece of omnibus [legislation] serving a very 
broad sphere of arbitration activity . . . . Modification would unnecessarily 
send a message of ambiguity and policy hostility to arbitration . . . .”155 
In contrast, while some AFA supporters offered testimony opposing the use 
of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration clauses across the board,156 more often, 
reform advocacy splintered. For example, when the AFA died in committee,157 
subsequent efforts to amend the FAA contracted in scope—the Automobile Ar-
bitration Fairness Act of 2008 sought only to prohibit mandatory arbitration 
provisions in leasing agreements between consumers and car dealerships,158 
and the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2008 aimed to restrict 
only certain pre-dispute agreements between nursing homes and their resi-
dents.159 Even those who testified in support of the AFA fractured into interest 
groups. For example, multiple witnesses limited their testimony to discrete 
subject areas—Tanya Solov of the North American Securities Administrators to 
securities;160 Richard M. Alderman to automobile dealers and consumers;161 
 
152. De Bernardo Testimony, supra note 151, at 3-4; Naimark Testimony, supra note 151 at 1; Pa-
rasharami Testimony, supra note 151, at 6-10; Rutledge Testimony, supra note 150, at 7; 
Schwartz Testimony, supra note 150, at 9-10. 
153. De Bernardo Testimony, supra note 151, at 2; Parasharami Testimony, supra note 151 at 1-2; 
Rutledge Testimony, supra note 150, at 6; see also Drahozal Testimony, supra note 150, at 9-
10; Naimark Testimony, supra note 151, at 9-10; Schwartz Testimony, supra note 150, at 4. 
154. Parasharami Testimony, supra note 151, at 3, 15-16; Rutledge Testimony, supra note 150, at 
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S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. 4–15 (2013) (statement of Vildan A. Teske, Partner, Crowd-
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and Michael Foreman to employment discrimination.162 Each witness, it 
seemed, sought to obtain specific exclusion from arbitration proceedings for 
his or her particular group, but not to address the larger problem that contract 
drafters were being given the ability to control closely the scope of their legal 
obligations under substantive law.  
In conclusion, with very few exceptions, the FAA has remained unchanged 
by Congress since its introduction in 1925,163 and recent efforts at legislative 
amendment show little promise. That fact renders the historical arc of the FAA 
somewhat astonishing, given that the scope of the FAA has nonetheless ex-
panded significantly since its enactment. These dramatic and repeated changes 
to the FAA, however, have been rendered not by Congress, but by the Supreme 
Court.164 As a consequence, any changes to the Court’s recent arbitration juris-
prudence, and its far-reaching implications for the substantive law, are unlikely 
to emanate from anywhere except perhaps a future—and different—Court. Un-
til such time, it is likely that this erosion of substantive law will continue una-
bated.  
conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s recent arbitration revolution, and its decision in Ital-
ian Colors in particular, is troubling insofar as it permits and creates an incen-
tive for entities to self-deregulate through private contract. The one remaining 
check on the power of these entities to self-deregulate, one would think, is the 
contractual counter-party. But this leaves a vast swath of the commercial land-
scape subject to this new deregulatory authority. Indeed, to suggest as a pana-
cea an increase in public awareness of the effects of the Supreme Court’s arbi-
tration jurisprudence is likely folly. Even if the various potential signers of 
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these contracts—consumers, employees, and the like—became aware of the 
larger deregulatory gambit, the very features of the arbitration cases and of the 
AFA that stymied public outcry and action remain in play. For one, these con-
tracts run the gamut, from cell phone, credit card, and shareholder agreements 
to employment contracts in all sorts of industries, and thus, again, would at 
best gain the ire of extraordinarily diffuse segments of the population.165 Along 
these lines, the signers of these contracts are comprised of individuals (and 
groups of individuals) who are at a relative disadvantage as a matter of finan-
cial or political power for purposes of effectuating change.  
Further, potential signers of these sorts of agreements will often lack the 
incentive, or even the option, to reject these contracts. Any individual signer of 
any individual agreement has not just an interest in signing that contract—be it 
to get a job, to establish a credit history, or even to get a good deal on a cell 
phone—regardless of its terms, but also often has no other choice. In any given 
instance, for any particular person, the trade might, on a micro level, be a 
“good” one. By allowing the exercise of private power over legal obligations to 
occur this way, contract drafters are able to retain a concentrated, nearly singu-
lar focus on hassle-free reduction of legal obligations, while contract signers are 
presented not with a question about whether corporations should be permitted 
to do this, but whether they need to take a particular job, to obtain a cell 
phone, or to open a credit card.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s arbitration revolution is even more troubling 
when one considers its distributional effects. Who is most at risk of corpora-
tions re-ordering their substantive legal obligations? It is the people with the 
least comparative leverage, the contractual counter-parties, who arguably 
should, but will not as a practical matter, serve as a check on this erosion of 
substantive law. Moreover, both the check of judicial supervision on arbitration 
agreements that erode substantive law, and the check on misconduct provided 
by substantive law itself, have been removed or eroded by the Court’s recent 
arbitration revolution. In allowing arbitration to expand with so few restraints, 
we have arguably privatized both the public realm and the substantive law into 
oblivion. 
 
165. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text. 
